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LABOUR STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ALL
STATES SHOULD HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PUNISH
MISCONDUCTS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW
Andrea Scozzaro*
INTRODUCTION
This article addresses the issues of unethical employment practices and
lack of fair labor standards in developing countries. The discussion on such
problems, although ongoing since the 1970s, is still of primary importance
both within the scholarly community and the wider public. The fact that big,
multinational enterprises of developed countries still engage in violations of
workers’ rights is certainly stunning, yet not so surprising given the
connections between such violations and the current structure of the global
economy. In the wake of a nearly fifty-years-old process of globalization,
the worldwide implementation of competition rules in the labor market
stimulates “race to the bottom” outcomes, with millions of workers in
developing countries suffering from slavery-like working conditions, wages
below subsistence level, and inhumane treatments.
Despite the progress made in the field of labor protection thanks to
private and governmental initiatives in the last several decades, the current
legal tools used to avoid massive workers’ rights violations have been
*
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proven ineffective. This is due to the apparently unsolvable friction that
exists between the huge economic power of enterprises and the desperate
need for economic support of developing countries.
Given the global nature of these causes, possible solutions may only
achieve success if they entail a global approach to the problem. Remedies
should be found in order to create a universal rule for labor protection
applicable and enforceable in all countries throughout the world.
The first part of this article explains which are the most widespread
violations of workers’ rights in relation to the current economic structure of
the world, and presents the economic dynamics that lie within them. The
second part provides a short account of past and present initiatives in favor
of the improvement of labor standards. The third part presents the main
critical aspects of these initiatives, by focusing on lack of accountability
mechanisms and their inherent voluntary nature. Finally, the fourth part
suggests the idea that a possible remedy aimed at stopping labor rights
violations is to create and implement a universal rule for labor protection
through international customary law. Such a remedy would also perform a
change in the way the responsibility for compliance to labor law is placed
upon states, by shifting the obligation to punish misconduct of multinational
enterprises from developing states to developed ones.
I.

PAST AND PRESENT VIOLATIONS OF LABOUR RIGHTS

As of 2015, poor labor conditions and weak labor standards are still the
norm in most developing countries.1 In some cases, national legislation
provides for labor protection and minimum standards, however many times
these rules remain unapplied.2 The problem of poor labor conditions is, in
fact, deeply linked with the overall structure of the world economy.3
1

See JENNY CHAN & CHARLES HO, THE DARK SIDE OF CYBERSPACE. INSIDE THE
SWEATSHOPS OF CHINA’S COMPUTER HARDWARE PRODUCTION (World Economy, Ecology
and Development 2008); FLORIAN BUTOLLO ET AL., BUY IT FAIR: GUIDELINE FOR
SUSTAINABLE PROCUREMENT OF COMPUTERS (Jan-Peter Hermann trans., World Economy,
Ecology and Development 2009); Sophie Stracke et al., IT Workers Still Pay the Price for
Cheap Computers, China Lab Watch (Nov. 2013), https://www.danwatch.dk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/IT-workers-still-pay-the-price.pdf; Charles Duhigg & David
Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built Into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costsfor-workers-in-china.html?_r=0.
2
See, e.g., Ronald B. Davies & Krishna C. Vadlamannati, A Race to the Bottom in
Labour Standards? An Empirical Investigation, 103 J. DEV ECON. 1 (2013); William W.
Olney, A Race to the Bottom? Employment Protection and Foreign Direct Investment, 91 J.
INT’L. ECON. 191 (2013).
3
See Adalberto Aguirre, Jr. & Ellen Reese, The Challenges of Globalization for
Workers: Transnational and Transborder Issues, 31 SOC. JUST. J. 1, 1 (2004).
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According to Harvard researchers Michael J. Hiscox and Nicholas F. B.
Smyth, many are the critics of the current globalized model of economy,
which allows corporations to exploit cheap labor in developing countries,
with the result of generating “race to the bottom” phenomena in labor
standards.4 In fact, due to being forced to compete between each other,
governments of developing countries struggle to keep on lowering labor
rights of their workers, so to encourage foreign investments of big
multinational employers.5
As scholar Lena Ayoub explains, in some cases, developed countries
which host multinational enterprises feature national legislations entitling
workers of basic labor standards.6 However, even with this, the economic
pressure multinational enterprises are able to put upon host countries is
more effective than the law in the books. The result is that many developing
countries are willing to condone the misbehavior of employers operating in
their territories, as long as multinational enterprises do not leave the
country.7 As corporations bring about investments and jobs, with the
consequence of an overall improvement of the country’s economic
conditions, host countries often directly engage in “advertising campaigns”
promoting their low requirements on foreign investments. In turn,
multinational enterprises do not hide that, due to high costs related to
compliance with higher labor standards, much of the choice on the location
of their business depends on local economic conditions in relation with
labor costs. As a consequence, developing countries are stuck in a situation
in which they are in need for money coming from investors, while they are
unable to increase their labor standards, as they are under the risk of losing
a significant part of their national income coming from foreign
investments.8
For what concerns the actual working conditions of workers from host
countries, critics have long been concerned about the use of “sweatshops”
for the production of a wide range of exporting items, from electronics9 to
4

Michael J. Hiscox & Nicholas F.B. Smyth, Is There Consumer Demand for Improved
Labor Standards? Evidence from Field Experiments in Social Product Labeling
(Weatherhead Ctr. for Int’l Affairs, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 2008-0058, 2005),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hiscox/files/consumerdemandfairlaborstandards
evidencesocial.pdf?m=1375386166.
5
Id.
6
Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It – and Why the United States Shouldn’t: The United
States’ International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights
Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395, 422-23 (1999).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Tragedies of Globalization: The Truth Behind Electronics Sweatshops. No
Contracts, Excessive Overtime and Discrimination: A Report on Abuses in Ten
Multinational Electronics Factories, China Labor Watch (Jul. 12, 2012,)
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clothing.10
In this regard, Ayoub argues that the practice of subcontracting the
manufacturing of their products to sweatshops has been very much common
among large multinational corporations, and it still is.11
Following the author’s description, some of the main features of
sweatshops include the following: “ten to twelve hour work days with
forced overtime; work that is performed in unsafe and inhumane conditions
(including exposure to poisonous chemicals); punishment for the slightest
mistake; locked dormitory work conditions; pay averaging less than a living
wage; excessively demanding long hours of work without compensation of
overtime pay; systematic abuse and/or sexual harassment of workers by the
employer(s); and/or the inability of workers to organize.”12 In many
instances, workers perform their duties inside enormous buildings where the
employer gathers hundreds of the workers altogether. Not infrequently
armed guards patrol the premises of sweatshops, in order to stop people
both from entering and leaving the building during work hours.13
Early developments of these manufacturing strategies took place in the
1970s, when multinational enterprises first began massively entering
developing countries’ labor markets, in order to cut off production costs and
increase profits.14 The fact that big multinational enterprises approached
developing economies was gladly welcomed by receiving countries. Thanks
to the positive conjuncture of the presence of easily corruptible politicians,
weak governments, already poor living conditions and huge masses of
people willing to work in return for very poor wages, developing countries
started to engage in a battle to serve foreign enterprises with environments
featuring constantly decreasing labor rights.15
II.

PRESENT

http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upfile/2011_7_11/20110712.pdf; T. Clarke & M.
Boersma, The Governance of Global Value Chains: Unresolved Human Rights,
Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply Chain, J. BUS. ETHICS, DOI
10.1007/s10551-015-2781-3 (July 2015); C. Myers, Corporate Social Responsibility in the
Consumer Electronics Industry: A Case Study of Apple Inc, Georgetown Univ. (2013),
http://lwp.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Connor-Myers.pdf.
10
See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and The Alien Tort Claims
Act, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1533 (1998); John Miller, Teaching about Sweatshops and the Global
Economy, 61 RADICAL TCHR. 8 (2001); Allie Robbins, The Future of the Student AntiSweatshop Movement: Providing Access to U.S. Courts for Garment Workers Worldwide, 3
LAB. & EMP. L.F. 120 (2013).
11
Ayoub, supra note 7, at 397.
12
Id. at 400.
13
Id. at 400-01.
14
Id. at 401.
15
Id.
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After more than forty years, the situation has unfortunately remained the
same. The particular example of working and living condition of Chinese
workers is striking. As writer Ross Perlin reports, Foxconn, the second
biggest company in the world for number of employees,16 counts some 1.4
million workers in only its Chinese plants.17 In those plants, underpaid and
exploited workers work up to one hundred hours a week and in extremely
unsafe environments in order to reach staggering levels of production of
electronic devices.18 Here, the workers execute the orders made by many of
the biggest electronics corporations on the planet, including Apple, Nokia,
and Sony.19 The conditions of Foxconn workers only begun to attract
coverage by media when in 2010, fourteen workers jumped off the windows
of the dormitories they lived in, in the desperate attempt of giving a voice to
their previously unheard outcries.20 As a consequence, the company
installed “suicide nets” across Foxconn buildings, created twenty four-hour
“care centres,” invented “no suicide agreements,” and engaged in recruiting
suicide-free pre-screened personnel. Despite all of these changes, the
company still failed in taking any major step to improve workers’ real
living conditions.21
Once the presence of multinational enterprises in developing countries
became more noticeable, governmental organizations on the international
train began the draft of a series of legal documents aimed at fixing
guidelines for the behavior of multinational enterprises.22 In this regard, the
contributions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have
been particularly significant.
As authors David Kinley and Junko Tadaki recall, these guidelines are
typically directed at states rather than corporations themselves and,
although not legally binding as they qualify as soft law instruments,23 they
foresee mechanisms of implementation, which enable a certain degree of
control on the behavior of firms with regard to labor standards.24
16

Ross Perlin, Chinese Workers Foxconned, DISSENT, Spring 2013, at 46, 47-48.
Id. at 46.
18
Id. at 47.
19
Id. at 47-48.
20
Id. at 46.
21
Id.
22
Ayoub, supra note 7, at 402.
23
Broadly defined by George Washington University Professor Dinah Shelton as,
“normative provisions contained in non-binding texts.” DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 292 (Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000).
24
David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
17
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However, despite the existence of such mechanisms, the effectiveness of
these guidelines in terms of monitoring and punishing firms’ misconduct
has been rather low.25
As the authors report, “the monitoring bodies do not function as judicial
or quasi-judicial bodies, but rather their roles are limited to clarification of
the interpretation of the instruments.” Furthermore, “they do not make
specific findings of misconduct by individual companies and their identities
are kept confidential, thereby shielding them from public scrutiny and
potential embarrassment.”26
In addition, on the side of hard law,27 in recent years, ILO has produced
many conventions signed and ratified by a number of states all over the
world. According to Ayoub, these conventions are addressed to states and
usually leave states the choice of implementing the best mechanism to
comply with the normative requirements they need. Traditionally, single
conventions cover a specific topic of concern, directly related to the issue of
improving poor countries’ labor standards and banning labor practices,
which clearly breach universally recognized human rights.28 Indeed, the
connection between labor law and human rights law are several. There are
more than seventy-five ILO conventions directly related to the provisions of
the U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Among the former, single conventions address the problem of forced
labor,29 minimum age of workers,30 minimum wage requirements31 and
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 931,
949 (2004); see also INT’L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1976).
25
“From the point of view of regulation of human rights abuses by TNCs, the
implementation mechanisms of the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration can hardly
be considered intrusive on states or corporations . . . Furthermore, while the Guidelines and
the Declaration encourage TNCs to respect internationally recognized human rights norms,
they simultaneously uphold the primacy of national law. Thus, they can do nothing to
prevent host States from adopting lax labor and environmental standards, and TNCs cannot
be condemned for taking advantage of such standards.” Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 25, at
950-51.
26
Id. at 950.
27
According to Arizona State University Professor Kenneth W. Abbott and Chicago
University Professor Duncan Snidal, in the field of International Governance, the term hard
law “refers to legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through
adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for
interpreting and implementing the law.” K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).
28
Ayoub, supra note 7, at 417–20.
29
Int’l Labour Org., Forced Labour Convention (Geneva: ILO, 28 June 1930); Int’l
Labour Org., Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (Geneva: ILO, 26 June 1957).
30
General Convention of the International Labor Organization, Minimum Age
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maximum working hours.32
However, in most cases, the whole set of conventions elaborated by ILO
falls into a trap render many other international law provisions ineffective,
namely the fact that conventions “are binding only upon ratifying states and
lack effective enforcement mechanisms in which to monitor state party
compliance.”33 It follows that, “if member states do not comply with the
standards derived from conventions, such states are not faced with any
sanctions or punishments.”34 The evident shortcomings of such legislation
may only be overcome by the use of persuasion and by implementing a
“name and shame” policy upon states through the mass media.
In fact, media pressure has already proven to be a powerful tool to
persuade big firms to behave responsibly.35
It was precisely what happened between the 80s and 90s to corporations
which centered their business around their name recognition: once the
media started to publicly expose the massive violations of human and
workers’ rights they had been responsible for many years, many of them felt
obliged to take steps towards changing their firm policies.36 As author Ryan
P. Toftoy recalls, in that period, big multinational enterprises became aware
of the fact that consumers were actually interested in the issue of
establishing safe and fair working standards for the workers who
manufactured the goods they could find in stores and shops in the
developed world.37 In the U.S. such an interest had remained silent for
Convention, U.N. Dᴏᴄ., A/CONF.(June 26, 1973).
31
Int’l Labour Org., Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, June 22, 1970,
http://ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMEN
T_ID:312276.
32
Int’l Labour Org., Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, Nov. 28, 1919,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=normlexpub:12100:0::no:12100:p12100_instrumen
t_id:312146:no; Int’l Labour Org., Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, Nov. 17. 1921,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_IN
STRUMENT_ID:312159:NO.
33
Ayoub, supra note 7, at 419.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 402 (“Once the news media published accounts of the systematic labor
violations occurring abroad, there was no economically sound way MNCs could go about
business as usual and still profit from their name recognition. While documented
corporations felt pressure to respond to the public outcry, corporations not documented for
any violations thrived off of the big name corporations being branded as human rights
violators . . . Furthermore, many corporations, in order to attract consumer approval and
procurement, engaged in product labeling whereby they affixed a label to their products
certifying that the products were made under acceptable working conditions.”).
36
Id. at 402-03; see also Helen Keller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and their
Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy, 194 LEGITIMACY IN INT’L L. 219 (2008).
37
Ryan P. Toftoy, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater.
Is Nike Just Doing It?,15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 905, 918 (1998).
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decades until it finally emerged in 1995. In that year, a survey
commissioned by Marymount University in Arlington (Virginia)38 was
published revealing that seventy-eight percent of the interviewed U.S.
consumers would avoid retailers if aware that they were dealing with
sweatshop goods, while only eighteen percent of consumers would shop
there anyway.39 For many big American corporations this fact marked a
milestone in the history of fair labor. The risk of losing profits due to
consumers’ awareness of violations of labor rights became a stimulant for
engaging in internal reforms aimed at improving employment practices. As
a result, many firms in the U.S. drafted and adopted self-imposed Code of
Conducts, establishing basic labor standards.40 These standards were
applicable to all the branches of their worldwide supply chain and banned
the most hideous practices such as the use of forced prison labor, as well as
child labor.41
In this regard, the most famous example has been perhaps the Code of
Conduct adopted by Nike, the world largest sneaker company,42 that
became famous throughout the 1970s and 1980s for massive violations of
human rights committed against its own workers or workers of its
subcontractors around the world.43 Some of the provisions of the 1992 Nike
Code of Conduct included the prohibition of the use of forced and underaged labor.44 The code also made efforts to establish standards regarding
minimum wage and maximum work hours, besides promoting compliance
with local labor law provisions.45 Some critics still think that Nike, as well
as other companies, which openly publicized campaigns in favor of
improving labor standards, only did it in order to regain the trust of their
consumers without engaging in any of the operations of improvement they
38

The Consumer and Sweatshops, MARYMOUNT UNIV. (last visited Feb. 1, 2016),
https://connect.marymount.edu/news/garmentstudy/overview.html.
This
survey,
commissioned by Marymount University, Center for Ethical Concerns and conducted by
International Communications Research, was repeated three times in 1995, 1996 and 1999.
39
Toftoy, supra note 38, at 919.
40
Id.
41
Ayoub, supra note 7, at 404.
42
Toftoy, supra note 38, at 919.
43
Ayoub, supra note 7, at 407. According to Ayoub, NIKE’s operations have been
located in South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand.
Currently, thousands of female workers employed at NIKE factories: are underpaid,
earning below a living wage; work twelve to fourteen hours per day, seven days a week;
suffer corporal punishment, abuse and sexual harassment; are children; and, have been
forced to work overtime in violation of laws regulating overtime wages. After being on the
defensive for quite some time, NIKE finally has publicly admitted that the conditions in its
factories need to be improved.
44
Id. at 410.
45
Id.
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had set forth.46 Despite this, the inauguration of the Code of Conducts is
remarkable. Such a phenomenon brought forth a wholly new approach to
the issue of fixing labor standards by moving from a traditional positivist
standpoint where international organizations and states are the only actors
in the international community responsible for drafting and enacting labor
law, to a view that acknowledges and holds private firms responsible as
well.
Yet, as Tufts University Professor Jette Steen Knudsen argues, “this
approach is still quite new as it has developed only in recent years, when
normative expectations about the role of the firm in society have shifted
from a traditional shareholder focus to include a diverse range of
stakeholder interests.”47 Consequently, now investors, NGOs, employees,
general customers, and the media have all become more used to the idea of
holding firms directly accountable for maintaining high social and ethical
standards.48
The same new approach lies right in the middle of another soft law
instrument, which has been promoted and has later seen the light under the
auspices of the United Nations, after being personally sponsored by formerUN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. According to expert in business ethics
and Professor at the University of Notre Dame (Indiana), Oliver F.
Williams, the new initiative, named UN Global Compact, “intended to
increase and to diffuse the benefits of global economic development
through voluntary corporate policies and actions.”49 The project consisted
of the draft of a legal document directly addressing private firms, which
includes nine to ten basic principles for firms to follow in order to
collectively take action to stop labor and human rights abuses. The UN
Global Compact is also concerned with environment and corruption and –
according to New York University School of Law Professor Philip Alston –
has been largely depicted on another soft law document, the 1998 ILO
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,50 to which the
scholarly community has often devoted much interest.51
In this regard, Alston argued that, although the Declaration was a soft
46

Id. at 411.
See generally Jette S. Knudsen, Company Delistings from the UN Global Compact:
Limited Business Demand or Domestic Governance Failure?, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 331
(2011).
48
Id. at 331.
49
Oliver F. Williams, The UN Global Compact: The Challenge and the Promise, 14
BUS ETHICS Q. 755 (2004).
50
See generally Hillary Kellerson, The ILO Declaration of 1998 on Fundamental
Principles and Rights: A Challenge for the Future, 137 INT’L LAB. REV. 223 (1998).
51
P. Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International
Labour Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 457, 518 (2004).
47
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law document, it constituted a revolution within the labor rights
legislation.52 The Declaration has had power because it has been claimed to
be applicable to every ILO Member State, regardless of the fact that
Member States have actually ratified the relevant conventions on the same
subject.53 The Declaration focuses on a set of rights, which have been
considered to be at the highest level of importance, surprisingly imposing a
hierarchy of principles in labor law. This set of “Core Labour Standards”
consists of freedom of association, freedom from forced labor, freedom
from child labor, and the principle of non-discrimination in employment.54
As previously announced the UN Global Compact incorporates these
principles while shifting the focus from states to firms, asking the latter to
actively join the project on a voluntary basis.
According to Williams, each firm participating in the UN Global
Compact is invited to develop a firm policy internalizing the principles
within the core of its business activity, as well as to perform periodic checks
on the evolution of such a process.55 In order to enhance transparency and
give incentive for firms to behave in a responsible way, a description of the
report has to be submitted to the project website. The initiative also entails a
penalty for firms that fail to comply with such a requirement, as firms not
submitting any report are delisted from the group of participants.56
The idea that lies behind the project, which in turn represents a real
novelty in comparison with the Code of Conducts, is to create a network of
ethically behaving firms rather than leaving this responsibility to single
firms alone. Moreover, such networks should be strongly integrated within
the neighboring environment, in order to elaborate the most appropriate
collective response to global problems in a local dimension.57
III.

CRITIQUE

Although the initiative entails a new and potentially striking approach, it
nonetheless falls into the same accountability trap as other such projects.
Hence, critics of the Compact have strongly stressed the fact that, even
though it features a self-monitoring activity, nobody can actually know if
the policy a firm claims to have undertaken has been actually followed.58 In
52

Id. at 459.
Id.
54
Id. at 458-59.
55
Williams, supra note 50, at 756. See also MALCOLM MCINTOSH ET AL., LIVING
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: STRATEGIC ROUTES TO SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS
(2003).
56
Williams, supra note 50, at 756.
57
Id. at 757.
58
Id.
53
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this respect, as Williams recalls, many scholars denounce the lack of an
independent monitoring system, claiming there is a need for a body of
monitors capable of transforming general principles into real practices by
means of “measuring” and “quantifying” corporate adherence to the
programme.59 Other critics hold a more radical position against the idea that
improvement in labor standards may be achieved through a mere voluntary
instrument, as they claim it takes a universally binding legal framework to
bring about labor protection and hold violators accountable.60 In addition,
according to Knudsen, evidence is given that despite the initial enthusiasm
that followed the UN Global Compact, in the last years many firms that had
previously committed to the humanitarian cause, have recently failed to
implement the action they planned, with the consequence of being removed
from the initiative.61
All in all, the UN Global Compact and all the other initiatives, both
private and public, have been proven to be far from perfect for the purpose
of solving the problem of labor standards inequality between developed and
developing countries. It is therefore essential to go beyond the currently
existing institutional networks and legal theories to find out which could be
the most optimal legal remedy to effectively tackle this problem for the
future.
IV.

REMEDY FOR FUTURE

As we have seen above, it is not unusual that violations of labor rights
take place in developing countries in spite of national legislation, which
although formally binding, results in being unapplied in a way or another,
even by claiming that visiting multinational enterprises enjoy special
exemptions under which domestic law does not apply. Moreover, as
Columbia Law School scholar Robert J. Liubicic recalls, host countries
normally engage in a competition to host foreign investors by offering the
least costly labor law arrangements and minimizing enforcement of labor
standards.62 According to Ayoub, the consequence is that, although in
theory the principal actors responsible for implementing fair labor standards
should be the governments of host countries (i.e. where the actual violations
take place), realistically the economic weakness of such states prevent them
from enforcing both international and domestic labor law provisions against
59

Id.
Id. at 758.
61
Perlin, supra note 17, at 331.
62
Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights through Private
Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 111, 149 (1998).
60
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visiting multinational enterprises.63 Given this premise, if we believe that
the issue of labor exploitation, due to globalization, has now become a
matter of concern for all countries in the world, it is clear that other ways to
oblige multinational enterprises to stop unlawful employment practices
must be found.
As a solution, the path we may follow to achieve such a goal could be
the one of prosecuting multinational enterprises for the violations
committed abroad in their home country. This idea has been taken further
by Ayoub, who places an obligation upon the U.S. to intervene in order to
stop worldwide violations of labor rights by convicting multinational
enterprises based within its territory.64 Hence, in her article, this scholar
argues that such an obligation derives from both the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which has been signed and ratified by the
U.S.65 and from international customary law.66 Furthermore, the U.S. itself
has a strong domestic legislation on labor rights67 which, however, it refuses
to enforce towards employees of foreign countries.68
With special regards to the Covenant, the author explains that Article 5
places both a right and an obligation upon states to check whether private
actors behave in a responsible way so to avoid violations of human rights
protected by the convention.69 Therefore, it would be the responsibility of
the U.S. to ensure private actors such as U.S.-based multinational
enterprises not to violate the rights listed in the Covenant, although they are
of civil and political nature. In this regard, the author explains “economic,
social and cultural measures run hand-in-hand with civil and political
protections because economic and social constraints placed upon society
lead to the eventual abuse of political and civil violations.”70 Thus, the
obligation upon the signatory states are not confined within the narrow
border of civil and political matters, but cover other basic rights whose
respect is of primary importance in order to fulfill civil and political aims.
An even more revolutionary approach to the issue of granting a
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worldwide recognition of the obligation to protect workers’ rights is to
place it under international customary law. Hence, this source of
international law is more effective than conventional law, since it is binding
on all states the world over, regardless of the single state’s willingness to
actively make efforts to grant labor protection to its citizens. This source is
also relevant for the purpose of holding private violators accountable for
labor law violations committed outside the states’ borders.
As proposed by Ayoub, placing an obligation on all states to protect
worldwide workers would allow and compel developed states to fill the gap
of developing states in ensuring and enacting labor law, by applying in
national courts universal rules on labor standards.71 In this respect, the real
question is to prove that basic labor standards, such as the prohibition of
forced and child labor, the obligation to provide adequate wages and to
establish a limit for work hours, are already norms in international
customary law.
Traditionally the scholarly community recognizes two main elements
for a norm of international customary law to be seen as such. Firstly, the
circumstance that the state to which the norm applies must have already
engaged in the practice provided by the norm (state practice). Secondly,
following such a practice must have been for the state the consequence of
considering the fact of conforming to the practice as a binding legal
obligation (opinio juris).72
In this respect, Pepperdine University (California) Professor of Law
Roozbeh Baker explains that since the 1970s, several scholars have started
questioning the legitimacy of the traditional definition of custom only based
on the adherence to such requirements, by calling for a change in the
interpretation of what actually defines international customary law.73 Such
scholars74 have often argued that the signing of a treaty or a convention,
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with special regards to the ones concerning human rights provisions, even
when it creates new legal norms, may be seen in itself as evidence of the
creation of new international customary law.75 By drafting from the
International Court of Justice finding in North Sea Continental Shelf, in
which the Court affirms that “widespread and representative participation in
a convention”76 as well as the passage of a “short period of time”77 may
suffice to establish an international customary norm binding on all states,
this strain of the non-traditional scholarship goes further. Hence, according
to Baker, these scholars argue that, instead of being a slow-paced
imperceptible movement, the formation of international customary law
should be regarded as a fast-moving process therefore capable of producing
sudden changes in the world legal sphere.78 As a consequence, for the nontraditional scholarship, the role of opinio juris in the formation of
customary law becomes predominant against state practice, being the latter
only a factor of secondary importance to prove the effectiveness of a
general acceptance of the rule, rather than the manifestation of single
political wills from states.79
The view we have presented so far has largely been drafted from the
position held by an earlier wave of legal scholars that have consistently
questioned the centrality of states in the process of creating international
customary law. According to these thinkers, states should no longer be
considered as being the only actors on the international train.80 For instance,
Professor of Law at U.C.L.A. School of Law Isabelle R. Gunning begins
her critique of the traditional international legal framework by challenging
the definition of “absolute state sovereignty” from a feminist and
Afrocentric perspective.81 As a result she finds that nowadays the notion of
state sovereignty should be reviewed as to include a “cooperative” as well
as a “coercive” foundation.82 In addition, as the world has been called for
the recognition of many existing international entities other than states, such
as international organizations which have progressively institutionalized
within the texture of international relations (the United Nations among the
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others) and non-governmental organizations, a reasonable effect of such
developments should be to allow non-sovereign entities into the process of
creating customary international law.83
According to her theory, the real challenge of modern times is to see
beyond the traditional understanding of international law that considers
inconsistent practice by states as a barrier for the formation of new
international customary law rules. In this respect the author wonders what
consequence stems from consistent behaviors of groups of nations working
collectively through an international organization body (such as the UN
General Assembly), while their behavior as “individual nations” has been
proven inconsistent.84 According to Gunning, the consequence is that
although disagreements between collective bodies or their members are not
uncommon, this bare fact does not exclude an effective regulatory power
upon the collective itself.85 Therefore, consistent state practices within
international organizations should count as relevant for the formation of
customary law. At the same time, the international community should
recognize the possibility for NGOs to take part in the law making process,
by recognizing the importance of their activism for promoting changes in
certain legal areas (for instance, women’s rights) and by virtue of their
accomplishments in monitoring the enforcement of international rules.86
Given these premises, the changes, which have affected the world in the
last several decades, urge the international community to take action in
order to modernize the current system of international customary law,
especially in the light of the fact that it still represents the most powerful
legal source at the international level. However, even regardless of this need
for a change in the traditional approach, it is not difficult to claim that some
basic rules concerning workers’ rights have already gained the status of
customary norms.
In this respect, Ayoub argues that a number of provisions deriving from
international treaties and conventions regarding the protection of workers’
rights;87 even if not directly binding for signatory states, are so widely
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accepted and followed that they fulfill the first requirement, namely state
practice, for international customary law provisions to become recognized
as such.88 Going through the analysis of the actual numbers of states signing
the relevant international documents,89 the author reaches the conclusion
that there is strong evidence to sustain that, for what concerns labor rights
regarding forced labor, minimum age, minimum wage and hours of work,
most states recognize and consistently assure through practice such rights.90
As for the second, requirement, namely opinio juris, the author submits that
all the states in which the enforcement of provisions in favor of the
protection of workers being born at international level amounts to the level
of state practice, such enforcement is the result of the state recognition of a
binding legal obligation to respect international labor rights.91 Hence, given
the fact the U.S. itself meets both the requirements of state practice and
opinio juris regarding international labor norms, the author claims that the
state is therefore under the obligation of punishing violations of workers’
rights committed by U.S.-based multinational enterprises.92
Although the example brought by Ayoub especially refers to the case of
the U.S. and the corporations based within its territory, the legal reasoning
that lies behind may indeed find application to all nations in the world, with
special regard for those developed countries which do not find themselves
in a impaired position due to lack of economic strength. In this respect, once
established a universal rule against the exploitation of workers, the issue of
its violations would primarily fall within the jurisdiction of the national
courtrooms of the state in which the corporation is based.93 However it is
not excluded that the jurisdiction for such complaints may also extend to the
International Court of Justice or any national judicial body entitled to decide
upon the violations of norms of international customary law committed
abroad, such as the U.S. district courts which are given jurisdiction for
breaches of “the law of the nations” under the Alien Tort Claims Act of
1789.94
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In addition, this circumstance would also prevent multinational
enterprises from avoiding lawsuits concerning violations of workers’ rights
by relocating their headquarters in developing states, where they may hope
for a milder judicial response to the violations they commit.
A possible negative result of a collective worldwide solution process is
that the final prices of manufactured goods may significantly rise if
multinational enterprises are not willing to cut back on their profits. As
Ayoub explains, this circumstance reveals an inherent contradiction
between the consumers’ will to find inexpensive products and their
intention to prevent human rights violations overseas.95 However, recent
experiments conducted by Harvard and Stanford researchers demonstrate
that there is an increasing consumer demand for goods made in workplaces
featuring fair labor standards.96 In some cases evidence shows that
consumers are even willing to pay a 45% premium for ethically labeled
goods, hence undermining the bad consequences of an increase in prices as
long as such an increase is the effect of rising worldwide labor standards.97
Finally, as Ayoub recalls, obliging multinational enterprises to apply
enhanced labor standards would create the positive impact of a wage
increase for all workers the world over, with the consequent benefit of
boosting consumer demand. This would achieve higher levels of
competition among countries and reaching higher efficiency trends in the
allocation of both labor and final goods.98
All in all, the final destination of this whole process of change in the
field of labor protection is the formation of a worldwide network of
international cooperation aimed at eradicating the practices of labor
exploitation, regardless of where they are committed. If both developed and
developing countries submit to a universal rule on labor protection, the
competition mechanism that nowadays stimulates race-to-the-bottom
outcomes in national legislations will finally come to an end.
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